The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The Myth of Hitler’s Greatest Armoured Defeat

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The actual number was 978 tanks in total — 306 German and 672 Soviet, according to Zamulin. As many as 400 Soviet and 80 German tanks were destroyed. The photographs were taken in the days immediately after the battle, while the Germans were still in control of the battlefield. Others, taken three weeks later, confirm the scale of the Soviet disaster. The outcome of the battle thus becomes, not a stalemate, but a total defeat for Soviet armour. The Battle of Prokhorovka has attained an almost holy status in Russian narratives of the war, celebrated not only as a victory but as a monumental and decisive engagement. In this book and the underlying research Ben Wheatley provides wholly persuasive empirical evidence that the familiar story of the battle is wrong. His findings speak for themselves and his clear, calm prose and evident respect for the Red Army serve only to make them more compelling. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Germany and the Second World War, Volume VIII, The Eastern Front 1943-1944 (2017).

The Panzers of Prokhorovka : Benjamin William Wheatley The Panzers of Prokhorovka : Benjamin William Wheatley

Whether the failure of Citadel was, as some historians have claimed, a turning-point in the war is also questionable, for the German position, not just on the Eastern Front, but in the war as a whole, was already parlous. What are the implications of this reassessment of Prokhorovka? It becomes a tactical victory for the German forces and a tactical disaster for the Red Army; but the German attempt to take the Kursk salient remains a strategic failure, and the fundamental reasons for this remain unaltered. Though Valeriy Zamulin, a Russian military historian and former curator of Prokhorovka, Museum, suggests a more modest figure for German losses, he still concludes that they lost as many as 80 tanks – against some 400 Russian losses. Losses in dispute Our servers are getting hit pretty hard right now. To continue shopping, enter the characters as they are shown The 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred from the control of the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 11 July. [1] All of its subordinate corps as of 12 July are listed below; [2] but the divisions, regiments and battalions directly subordinate to the Army's Headquarters are not listed. [1].

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While the battle is generally considered a tactical success for the German side due to the high numbers of Soviet tanks destroyed, [203] in the wider perspective the Soviets successfully completed their defensive operation at Prokhorovka and created the conditions for their decisive counteroffensive, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, just as planned. [204] Ultimately there was no German breakthrough at Prokhorovka or elsewhere in the Kursk salient, becoming the first time in the Second World War that a major German offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate into their operational or strategic depths. [205] With the end of Operation Citadel, the strategic initiative permanently swung over to the Soviet Union for the rest of the war. [206] Misconceptions and disputes [ edit ] Size of the tank battle and German losses [ edit ] Despite the huge number of tanks involved, Wheatley estimates the battlefront to have been no more than 3km (2 miles), so that, as he comments, ‘the location of one of the most famous battles of the Second World War was able to be photographed by the Luftwaffe in a single shot.’

The Panzers of Prokhorovka by Ben Wheatley | Waterstones The Panzers of Prokhorovka by Ben Wheatley | Waterstones

The present academic consensus has it that the cream of Hitler’s armoured formations, the thuggish paramilitary SS Panzer Divisions, were smashed in this battle, losing hundreds of tanks, and never recovering their former capabilities. In reality, diligent archival research reveals that only 16 tanks from the SS formations were lost. In fact, by the end of the Kursk fighting, these units had more tanks than they started with. Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-0899-7. There are some issues with the book, however, particularly its handling of the wider context of the Eastern Front. Although Wheatley’s thesis reveals the amazing information of only 16 German tanks lost in a battle that was reputed to have destroyed hundreds, his introduction states the view that the Eastern Front was the crucial theatre of the war because of the severe German losses that occurred there.

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It has been accorded great significance in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian history. Although considered a stalemate in which both Russian and German forces suffered enormous losses, the German tank loss was supposedly so great that Prokhorovka is thought to have played a major part in the outcome of the wider Battle of Kursk.

The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The Myth of Hitler’s Greatest The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The Myth of Hitler’s Greatest

Losses for 12 July are difficult to establish for either combatant. Tank losses attributed to the German side vary, [184] in part due to the Wehrmacht 's methodology for counting and reporting equipment losses. Only equipment that could not be repaired or that had to be abandoned were counted as losses, but damaged equipment that could be recovered and repaired were simply listed as such. [185] [186] Likewise, reliable figures for tank and personnel casualties for the Red Army in the Battle of Prokhorovka are difficult to establish. [187] German [ edit ] Glantz, David (2012). Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941. Gloucestershire, UK: The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-6070-3. Brand, Dieter (2003). "Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil II)"[60 years ago: Prokhorovka (Part II)]. Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (in German). Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport (6). Archived from the original on 1 November 2014. Dunn, Walter (1997). Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-275-95733-9. a b The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was initially not part of the 5th Guards Tank Army. It was transferred from the control of the 1st Tank Army to the 69th Army on 10 July, and then to the 5th Guards Tank Army on 11 July ( Glantz & House 2004, p.318).

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Comparing Soviet and German archives, the total number of tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles such as assault guns and self-propelled guns deployed by the 5th Guards Tank Army and the II SS-Panzer Corps around Prokhorovka during the battle numbered only about 910. [104] The II SS-Panzer Corps never had the number of tanks and assault guns attributed to it by Soviet estimates at any point during Operation Citadel, [129] not even at the start when it fielded only 494. [209] Even if the definition of the battle was broadened to include the III Panzer Corps and the portion of the 5th Guards Tank Army that faced it, the total number of tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles comes out at a maximum of 1,299. [104] In contrast, for example, the Battle of Brody during Operation Barbarossa involved over 2,000 tanks, up to 6,000 tanks over the duration of the battle, engaged in combat over a 70-kilometre (43mi) front. [210] [211] Nonetheless, the Battle of Prokhorovka is still regarded as one of the largest tank battles in military history. The two German pincers, the one from the north commanded by Model, the other from the south with Manstein in overall command and Hoth in charge of 4th Panzer Army, both ran into fierce resistance from Soviet forces in entrenched positions. The northern offensive made particularly slow progress. Archival data of the II SS-Panzer Corps shows that the corps had 294 operable tanks and assault guns on the evening of 11 July, and 251 on the evening of 13 July. [77] Allowing for the possibility that some repaired tanks were returned to service on 13 July, these numbers indicate that at least 43 tanks and assault guns became inoperable during this period, which includes all ten Tigers belonging to Totenkopf and one belonging to Leibstandarte. [191] An estimated total of 60–80 tanks and assault guns of the II SS-Panzer Corps were damaged or destroyed in combat on 12 July. [192] [193] By the end of 16 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps had 292 serviceable tanks and assault guns, almost the same number it had at the beginning of the battle on 12 July. [194] On 12 July, Schlachtgeschwader 1 of the 8th Air Corps reported 11 aircraft damaged, all by Soviet anti-aircraft artillery, of which 6 were total write-offs. [6] Soviet [ edit ] Destroyed Soviet T-34, 1943

Prokhorovka: the greatest tank battle in history? | The Past

Glantz, David (January 1991). Soviet Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London; Portland, OR: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-4077-8. German success can be explained by two factors: an astonishing error made by Russian commanders, and the consequent opportunity for their German counterparts to display the superiority of their new tanks and their firepower. The Soviet tank charge The RRP is the suggested or Recommended Retail Price of a product, set by the publisher or manufacturer. Zamulin, Valeriy (2017). Прохоровка. Неизвестное сражение Великой войны[ Prokhorovka: The Unknown Battle of the Great War] (in Russian). Moscow: Yauza. ISBN 978-5-906716-63-7.Wheatley reveals the truth about the Battle of Prokhorovka in July 1943, “the greatest armoured clash in history”: it was indeed an operational victory for the Soviets, but it came at a huge cost and – contrary to popular belief – utterly failed to destroy Hitler's elite panzer force. German domination of the Prokhorovka air space occurred for several reasons. During the initial stages of the battle it was Soviet tanks that were hit and burned, obscuring the battlefield which made it difficult for Soviet commanders to develop a clear picture of the situation. Added to that was the failure to provide air liaison officers with Red Army forces, who were then unable to call for air support when the German assault formations first appeared. Whereas the German 8th Air Corps assembled powerful concentrations over the Prokhorovka battlefield, the 17th Air Army spread its forces thinly, to support other sectors; the Soviets dominated the air over the 4th Panzer Army's flanks, leaving the skies over Prokhorovka clear. The 2nd Air Army's fighter aviation had been reduced to 266 aircraft, and this force was used in the fighter escort, not the air superiority role. [6] The battle of Prokhorovka absorbed the 8th Air Corps' combat power to the extent it was unable to intervene to support the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, enabling Soviet defences to defeat the attempted breakthrough in that sector. [6] The book is also a masterclass in source analysis. In other words, the examination of a document not only for what it says, but for its own history. Who produced it? And for what purpose? Wheatley shows that hard work and diligence with a source – questioning whether it may be biased or simply false – is so vital to good history. There is a brilliant lesson here for aspiring academics. As we have seen, the aims of the operation were modest and essentially defensive. Frieser argues that its failure was ‘pre-programmed’, as Hitler had decided from the outset to terminate if the Allies landed in Sicily. In any case, it would have failed due to what he calls ‘the law of numbers’, for the Germans were hopelessly outmatched in manpower and productivity.